US National Security Posture & Munich

J.D. Vance's Munich speech, if viewed to be the new national security posture of the United States, would point to a dramatically different set of threats and requirements for DoD.

It has been taken as a given by most commentators that the new Trump administration would focus on “Great Power Competition” with China. This is reflective of the first Trump administration’s frosty relationship with China, Washington’s longstanding view that it should “pivot” to Asia, and the appointment of men such as Elbridge Colby, Michael Waltz and Marco Rubio to major national security positions. However, the priorities identified by Vice-President JD Vance in the first major national security address by the administration are markedly different.

"…the threat that I worry the most about vis-à-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values—values shared with the United States of America.”

Vice President J.D Vance, Address at Munich Security Conference

Vance, in a wide-ranging speech, points not to great power threats, but to cultural threats to what he deems to be “fundamental values” - values shared between Europe and the United States. To illustrate this, he points to European governments posing restrictions on rightwing speech and mass migration.

I’m not going to attempt to take apart or argue with his assessment, though I do not share it. Instead, it’s worth thinking through what this means from a national security posture.

If the Trump administration truly believes that threats to fundamental/traditional values posed by limitations on far-right political activity and mass migration are the main national security threats than this has profound implications for the likely Department of Defense. This can be combined with the seventeen priority areas identified by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to create a better sense of where spending may flow in FY 2026 and beyond.

Lastly, for better or worse, one should look at saber rattling around Greenland, President Trump’s repeated statements around Canada becoming a state, and ongoing discussion of military operations against cartels in Mexico. Oh, and Panama - I almost forgot to include the threats to seize the Panama Canal.

Further into the mix can be the Trump administration’s trade policy which, while addressing China, seems primarily oriented around attempting to force the reshoring of manufacturing capability in the United States. Again, I’m not agreeing with the approach, just trying to understand what the geopolitical posture of the administration may be.

The result of all of this is a posture that can best be described as focused on securing what I’m going to call “Hemispheric Dominance” as an area of American control while reducing our exposure to major external conflicts. Early evidence can be seen in tensions with Ukraine and Europe over negotiations with Russia and repeated statements questioning the value of the United States defending Taiwan (here, here and here for some examples).

Rather than having the US military organized as an expeditionary force with a heavy presence overseas, you would see a transition to a force largely positioned in or around the continental United States. It is likely that you’d still need some long-range strike solutions to serve as deterrents, but the number of systems and support currently being developed around deterring China from establishing dominance of the South China Sea would be far less important. Such a posture has implications for force structure, expected platform acquisitions, and RDTE priorities.

A military force oriented around Hemispheric Dominance would likely have less need for major Army formations/heavy armor, far fewer requirements for large surface platforms/power projection, and far less demand for stealth-enabled tactical aircraft. This force mix would instead feature a heavy emphasis on space, AMD systems, unmanned platforms for operations in the near abroad, and controlling US airspace, and the C5ISR architecture to support this.

Conveniently, this style of force structure also aligns with the Trump administration’s defense tech-oriented senior leadership and their fiscal goals. Traditional defense suppliers (Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Boeing, HII, Northrop Grumman) remain the only capable providers who can deliver most of the traditional defense platforms (heavy armored vehicles, large surface combatants, stealth-enabled tactical aircraft). All of these major systems could be de-emphasized while smaller, more agile providers such as Anduril, Palantir, and Kratos already have a major presence in the technology categories to support Hemispheric Dominance.

Not only would this empower Trump administration supporters, but it could potentially allow for additional savings to be plowed into other fiscal priorities. Military personnel and operations & maintenance spending take up over half of the defense budget. Reducing the Army’s size to reflect its new mission would be a source of clear savings (or at least remove the need for growth above inflation, allowing the administration to pocket budgetary savings).

This would represent a rather radical shift from the post-Cold War consensus of an engaged, internationally-oriented America and it leaves questions as to how to balance other administration priorities (most notably its posture vis a vis Iran). However, if we are to take the administration at its word, this sort of transition would seem to be likely. The FY 2026 President’s Budget Request is likely to be released in May. It will be interesting to see whether the structure outlined above is represented in the request.